1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON	
3	ROBERT M. LYDEN, an) individual,	
4	Plaintiff,	Case No. 3:14-cv-01586-MO
5	v.	Case NO. 3:14-CV-01300-MO
6)	November 6 2015
7	ADIDAS AMERICA, INC., a Delaware corporation, et al.,	November 6, 2015
8	Defendants.	Portland, Oregon
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15	Markman Hearing	
16	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS	
17	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL W. MOSMAN	
18	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE	
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20	ALSO PRESENT:	Ms. Sara Vanderhoff
21		Mr. Christopher Wolpert
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(PROCEEDINGS)

THE CLERK: Your Honor, this is the time and place set for a *Markman* hearing in Case 3:14-cv-01586-MO, Robert Lyden versus adidas America, Inc.

Counsel, please identify yourself for the record.

MR. FELDMAN: Your Honor, Stephen Feldman of Perkins Coie on behalf of the defendants.

I'd like to introduce to the Court my co-counsel,
Matias Ferrario, and we have two company representatives from
adidas, Sara Vanderhoff and Christopher Wolpert.

THE COURT: Thank you all.

Go ahead and introduce yourself on the record.

MR. LYDEN: Yes. I'm Robert Lyden, the plaintiff.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to give each side a couple minutes just to tell me what you think the core of this dispute is about. It's partly -- candidly, partly for me to just hear it, and also for me to get a feel for what this is going to sound like to a jury.

So I'll start with defendants.

MR. FERRARIO: Thank you, Your Honor. Matias Ferrario here.

We've provided you with a presentation, I think, at the outset.

MR. FELDMAN: If we can --

THE COURT: Yes, you can forward that.

MR. FELDMAN: (Handing.)

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. FERRARIO: At this juncture, Your Honor, there are two patents at issue here. And of those two patents, there are three claim terms which we think require construction, and there are two terms that we contend are incapable of construction and are indefinite. And we have had a meet and confer with Mr. Lyden prior to today's hearing to discuss how to address those, and if you'd like to hear that, we've come to an agreement where we would do it term by term with respect to the two patents. But we'd defer to Your Honor, of course.

THE COURT: What I'd like first is your general statement, if you have one ready, of what you think is at the core of this dispute.

MR. FERRARIO: Sure, Your Honor.

So there are three terms at the core of this dispute here. One is the term "affixed," and whether that means you have to have separate pieces of the shoe that are attached to each other, somehow affixed together.

The second issue is "anteriormost side." And that relates to the inferior spring element which comes off the bottom of the shoe and whether that has to have all six distinctive sides.

And then the third issue is this term "anterior tangent point." And the question is what does "tangent" mean

with respect to that term, and we think that that is a term that requires construction.

Those are the three terms we think require construction.

We think there are two terms that are indefinite.

Those terms are "said transverse axis" in the '878 patent, and the other term is "similar to" in the '797 patent.

With respect to "said transverse axis," we think, one, that there is improper antecedent basis because there is a reference to "said transverse axis," and it is impossible to know which transverse axis of the two transverse axes that the claim is referring to; and second, with respect to "similar," we think there is no teaching within the patent as to how similar something must be, it's a term of degree, and without any further teaching in the patent, we do not think that it is capable of construction.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Do you wish to make a general statement of what you think this is about?

MR. LYDEN: Your Honor, I think he's done a pretty good job in covering what we need to talk about today. We have different points of views on many of these things.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. LYDEN: That's about it.

THE COURT: Let's do this term by term. And so I'll

1 start with the phrase or term "similar to." 2 I have defendants' argument, not proposing a 3 definition but simply claiming that it's not capable of definition; that it's indefinite. 4 5 What's your response to that? It is capable, and I provided 6 MR. LYDEN: 7 information, and there is intrinsic evidence in the prosecution of the patent to show what that is. 8 The definition you provided is 9 THE COURT: "resembling without being identical," first of all. 10 11 MR. LYDEN: Or --12 THE COURT: "Almost identical." So let's take the first one. You say something is 13 14 similar to means resembling without being identical. 15 sure you've advanced the ball down the field very far. You've 16 really just said the same thing in a clunkier way. So I 17 probably wouldn't do anything with that definition. "Almost identical" is a quantitative definition. 18 19 Where would you get the idea that it's almost identical as 20 opposed to something less than that towards the goal of being 21 identical? 22 MR. LYDEN: Sure. I get your point. 23 Your Honor, they have a presentation --THE COURT: Let's just -- do you have a green light 24 on your microphone, at the base of it there? 25 Is it on?

1 MR. LYDEN: Yes, I do. Do I need to get it closer? 2 Why don't you remain seated and pull it THE COURT: 3 closer to you, and that will help us. MR. LYDEN: (Complies.) 4 5 The defendants have a presentation today. 6 prepared my notes and a brief, essentially, and I've already 7 given that to them, and if you would like, I can give you a copy of it and then you would be able to follow what I'm going 8 to say and have a record of it and be able to reference 9 10 something. 11 THE COURT: You can hand a copy forward. 12 Here's how this is going to go. I have certain 13 questions, and answering those questions might not take 150 14 PowerPoint slides to get there. And so if it doesn't, then we 15 won't see those. 16 So go ahead and hand those to Mr. Bean. 17 MR. LYDEN: (Complies.) 18 THE COURT: Right now I just wanted to ask you to 19 answer my question. Where do you get from intrinsic evidence the idea that "similar to" means almost identical? 20 21 MR. LYDEN: During the prosecution of the patent, the 22 examiner had raised the indefiniteness issue, and there was 23 discussion by the examiner about curvatures and the components 24 that were involved; in particular, the inferior spring And in my patent, the superior spring is the part on 25 elements.

top, and the inferior part is the one that ramps down like a ski ramp kind of like.

And in the claims there's two inferior spring elements that are positioned across from one another, and I defined in the claims that the top curvature of these two spring elements are similar to one another. And during the prosecution of the patent, I provided to the examiner photos of actual prototypes that I had made showing inferior spring elements.

As a matter of fact, one of the images, which is on page 30 in something I've given you, is an inferior spring element that was actually made by cutting it down the middle. So both parts have, insofar as you can do in manufacturing, an identical curvature on the top side.

Now, what the differences were between the two is because one is on the medial side, which is the inside of the shoe (indicating), and one of them lays on the outside, kind of like this one (indicating), and when you have a part like that, and especially if you make it out of carbon fiber steel, or even in this case plastic, if you leave a sharp scissors-like edge there, you've got something that will cut somebody. And so what you do is you bevel or taper the edge, and so even though the top curvature of the springs in all other aspects may be identical or nearly identical at the lateral side and the medial side, there's some tapering going on on the top side

because you put a bevel on it.

And that was really what was discussed and shown to the examiner that I can't -- you know, I can't say that they are absolutely identical, but they are substantially so, and -- and they are similar to one another, with the exception --

THE COURT: I need you to pause -- I need you to pause if I ask you a question.

MR. LYDEN: Sure.

THE COURT: We have a court reporter taking it down.

So what we're looking for is how someone reading the patent would know what "similar to" means. So your explanation of how the manufacturing process works here in court today won't help in that effort at all. We're stuck with a closed universe of words that you can point to that define the phrase "similar to."

Now, that can include what happened in the prosecution history. So I need you to tell me where you're relying on in the prosecution history that someone reading the prosecution history can figure out that "similar to" means almost identical to.

MR. LYDEN: Right.

THE COURT: What text are you relying on for --

MR. LYDEN: That is in what I've provided to you just now, and that is in -- yeah, it's in Exhibit M-13. And it's -- in particular, in M-13, if you were to look at this -- and it's

pages 27 to 30, 39 to 40, and in particular, 57 to 62. And at pages 57 to 62, I am discussing this with the examiner, specifically this subject, and -- and state why the language is being used and also discussing some things about the shape of the inferior spring elements and the differences there and some things that I thought would be helpful to the examiner.

So there is a spot that you can look right in the prosecution where you can see the figures, you can see the discussion that went on, and anyone looking at that discussion, a person skilled in the art would know, okay, if we make a inferior spring element that has the same top curvature on the medial and lateral sides, and all we've got is just differences in the beveling at the edges, we're going to be infringing, because it was very clearly talked about as to how and why that language "similar to," what that meant, and that is what it meant.

THE COURT: When in this discussion do you link the description to the phrase "similar to"? I see the description, but I don't see how one reading it would know that you're defining the phrase "similar to." I mean, since I'm only just glancing at it, I may have missed that. Where is that?

MR. LYDEN: Let me show you, because I think I saw the reference. I'll try to find that.

So if you'll look at Exhibit No. 13, you can see on page 4 there is a photo of the inferior spring element --

1 actually, there's two of them, and it was made by cutting right 2 down the middle so that they have the exact same top curvature 3 and they're beveled on --THE COURT: So I've heard you say that, and since my 4 5 time is limited, I need you to focus on the question I'm actually asking you. So, ideally, if this -- if you were 6 7 giving me the perfect evidence, you'd point in the prosecution history to where you told the Patent Office that "similar to" 8 means almost identical to. Obviously, you don't have that. So 9 where is it that you tell the Patent Office what "similar to" 10 11 means? And so the photograph won't get you there. 12 MR. LYDEN: Right. 13 I believe it's here. 14 (There is a pause in the proceedings.) 15 THE COURT: Do you have it? 16 I've got these scattered within about MR. LYDEN: five pages of discussion about not only the curvature but the 17 18 shape of the object. 19 THE COURT: Let me make your search simpler. Show me 20 anywhere in those five pages where the words "similar to" 21 appear. 22 So I'm going to come back to you on that question. 23 Let me ask a related question. Typically, a patent, 24 if it used a phrase like "similar to," would be claiming all forms of similarity from as close as you can get to identical 25

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to as far away as you can get from identical and still be similar. And so a discussion that a particular embodiment or manufacturing process might produce pairs that are similar, in the sense of being almost identical, wouldn't disclaim a broader interpretation unless you had more than that. Do you have more than that? MR. LYDEN: (No response.) THE COURT: Or did you hear my question? I heard your question. I believe I have MR. LYDEN: more than that, but --THE COURT: I'm going to turn to your opponent while you look for the phrase "similar to." What I'm going to do is turn to your opponent while you look for the phrase "similar to" in the prosecution history. Let's assume it's in there, or something like it is

Let's assume it's in there, or something like it is in there. What do you make of that other otherwise intrinsic evidence?

MR. FERRARIO: Yes, Your Honor, that is a good question. And I believe it is in there, and perhaps to help out there, I think we cite to it in our brief that there is a line on page 9 of what is, I think, M-13, what we'll call M-13, that does provide this boundary of -- this picture which I have in front of you is being discussed in that section. It shows these curves as being similar, having similar curve shapes.

And I think to a question you asked earlier, maybe

that provides one boundary of this objective boundary that's required under *Nautilus* and *Interval Licensing* case law. And I say maybe because it's not entirely clear, well, what is still almost identical in that case.

But there is nothing on the other end of that boundary which is required by case law, which is to say you need to understand what's not similar. And I think if you look at the specification and you look at the prosecution history, that is the piece that's just missing.

THE COURT: So your argument is that one iteration of being similar can be almost identical, but there's nothing that says every other iteration of being similar is somehow disavowed by the patent?

MR. FERRARIO: That's right. And I think that you'll find similar reasoning in the ACQIS decision that we cited in our case. And it had the exact same thing, where the plaintiff had argued that there was a design -- a circuitry design that was identical. It was identical, they kept saying, and then they said, well, and all of these other figures are completely different. The court there found that there was no objective boundary to determine what's similar and what's not similar, and for that reason, the claim term was indefinite.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Do you wish to speak further to what those five pages or other pages of M-13 teach about this phrase?

MR. LYDEN: Well, I think he did find the words

"similar," and I think he forgot -- yeah, that page, which is

page 15 of M-13, talks about the two inferior spring elements.

It talks about their shape and it talks about them having

similar curved configurations. And what's made clear is that

the top curvature of the two is the same except for what goes

on on the medial and lateral sides.

So I think by my discussion, combined with the image

that I provide, provided sufficient disclosure to someone

skilled in the art that they would realize that if they wanted

that I provide, provided sufficient disclosure to someone skilled in the art that they would realize that if they wanted to avoid infringement, they would make the inferior spring elements on the medial and lateral sides have a different top curvature.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I want to take up the next phrase that's said to be indefinite, the "said transverse axis."

If I understand the defendants' position, one of the reasons you think it's indefinite is that you can't locate the transverse axis as between running through the spring elements versus running through the bottom of the shoe. Is that right?

MR. FERRARIO: Yes, Your Honor, that's right.

THE COURT: What else makes it indefinite, in your view?

MR. FERRARIO: Sure. So that's the part where we say is the antecedent basis problem because the claim taught there

1 says footwear having a transverse access, the spring element 2 having a transverse axis, and then later refers to "said 3 transverse axis, " and our contention is you can't tell which one --4 So just for my purposes, looking at the 5 THE COURT: phrase, that's why you think the word "said" is troubling here, 6 7 from your perspective? MR. FERRARIO: That's right. So under typical claim 8 drafting, in black letter claim construction drafting, "said," 9 the definite article refers to -- the article that's 10 11 introduced, the component that's introduced with an indefinite 12 article. So there's a first thing, a second thing. 13 THE COURT: All right. And if I remember correctly, 14 then, your second problem is you're not sure that one skilled 15 in the art would know where to place the transverse axis on the 16 longitudinal axis, right? 17 MR. FERRARIO: That's correct, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Well, in one of your proposed 19 definitions -- you may have moved away from that by now -- you 20 place it at the triple intersection of the transverse axis, the longitudinal axis, and the flexural axis, right? 21 22 MR. FERRARIO: That's right. 23 THE COURT: And that would be a clearly identified point if it were correct, wouldn't it? 24 MR. FERRARIO: That's right. We would agree with 25

that. There is disclosure of that in the '878 patent.

The problem with that is -- and I think we've kind of moved away from an alternative construction because it's looked at in the '797 specification, there are very clear pictures of the flexural axis and the transverse axis not lining up. So there is no X marks the spot. And this is the teaching of the patent that we think supports the notion that the '878 patent doesn't provide for the location along the longitudinal axis of where this transverse axis is.

THE COURT: Doesn't provide it not so much by the indefiniteness of the phrase itself but because of multiple possible locations?

MR. FERRARIO: That's exactly right.

THE COURT: In the intrinsic evidence?

MR. FERRARIO: Yes, that's exactly right.

And ultimately the problem here, as well as -- well, I guess the question would be why does it matter. And the reason it matters is because the claim element that follows, which requires one to measure the concavity downwards and the length of the side of this inferior spring element is measured from a reference point. That reference point is the transverse axis. And if you can move that transverse axis -- it's always 90 degrees, we know that, but if you can move it up and down the longitudinal axis indefinitely, you just don't know. You don't know whether your inferior spring element is longer on

1 one side or has greater concavity because that transverse axis 2 can be anywhere along the longitudinal axis. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. Is there a way one skilled in the art would know 4 where to put the transverse axis on the longitudinal axis? 5 MR. LYDEN: 6 Yes. 7 I should say is there one and only one THE COURT: way, as opposed to multiple ways one would know where to put 8 it? 9 10 MR. LYDEN: I can speak to how I did it. I can't say 11 how someone else might come to the same thing. 12 THE COURT: Well, oddly enough, how you did it is irrelevant to my decision. It's precisely how one skilled in 13 14 the art would do it that matters. 15 MR. LYDEN: Well, you know, there's a point here I'd 16 like to make about the two patents. The earlier patent was the 17 first filed in a chain that became pretty lengthy. The second 18 patent that we're speaking about today was filed about 12 years 19 later, and it was the product of about four continuations in 20 part. Some of the case law that the defendants have cited, 21 22 it's a little misleading as to whether you can read from 23 disclosure in a later patent and try to bring it back into an earlier one. You know, they cited -- I believe it was 24

Microsoft and Jonsson v. Stanley Works. And the difference

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between those cases and this one is that they dealt with patents in a chain that were continuations. They had the identical specification, they had the identical drawings. All that was happening there was people were putting new claims and getting new patent. So there was no continuation, there was no new matter.

My earlier patent has 29 drawings. The later one has 629. There's 600 drawings difference and hundreds of pages of disclosure differences between the two. And I departed from the specific orientation of the three axes in the first one when I did the second one because I wanted to claim new and different matter.

So in the first patent that we're looking at, the X marks the spot where the longitudinal axis, the flexural axis, and the transverse axis all meet is really very clearly defined, and anyone looking at it knows exactly where it is. There's no bones about it. So it's very definite in the earlier patent what that is and what that's about, and I don't think there could be any question about where it is.

The axes, longitudinal and transverse axes were introduced, you know, for the same reason you have longitude and latitude. When you want to speak about the object and you want to say something about the orientation of the inferior spring elements, what angles they come off, you have to have a reference point. So all the longitudinal and transverse axes

1 do is give you a reference point. 2 The defendants, you know --3 THE COURT: Let me ask you this. In the '797 patent are you attempting to claim a transverse axis that can be 4 5 placed anywhere along the longitudinal axis? MR. LYDEN: I don't believe that it's relevant to 6 7 most of the claims in that patent. In the earlier patent --THE COURT: Well, before we get to relevance, just 8 9 start with your answer to my question. 10 You've suggested that you claimed something different 11 on this score in the '797 patent --12 MR. LYDEN: Right. 13 THE COURT: -- than the '878 patent. So now I'm 14 asking are you claiming in the '797 patent that there are 15 multiple places along the longitudinal axis that one could find 16 the transverse axis? I think I'd have to look at all 20 claims 17 MR. LYDEN: 18 before I could give you an intelligent answer there. 19 THE COURT: Well, I thought that the answer was 20 simple, in light of what you've just said, so let me make sure 21 I understand you. 22 MR. LYDEN: Well, it's very simple --23 THE COURT: Let me finish my question. 24 MR. LYDEN: Sure. 25 So I guess I could flip it around and say THE COURT:

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where the transverse axis is found.

are you claiming in the '797 patent that the transverse axis must meet along the longitudinal axis where those two intersect with the flexural axis? In other words, is X marks the spot true of the '797 patent also or just the '878 patent? It is true, but in the latter patent, MR. LYDEN: I -- some of the embodiments that I taught showed what happens if you move an inferior spring element to the left or to the right along the transverse axis. And so the inferior spring element will -- will sometimes not have, if it's a single spring, it's still going to have an intersection point. If it's a pair side by side, it may not intersect with the flexural axis of the two because it's splitting down the middle and it's deadening between them. And --THE COURT: Is that intended to be an embodiment that represents an embodiment that follows the patent? MR. LYDEN: Yes. THE COURT: So then for that to be true, you'd have to be claiming in '797 something a little broader than you're claiming in '878, wouldn't you? It's a different set of claims directed MR. LYDEN: to some different structures, so it doesn't quite -- I don't know that broadness of scope is so much the issue. THE COURT: Well, you've talked about where you put I'm not so much concerned about the spring as the springs.

Right. 1 MR. LYDEN: 2 So splitting the springs down the middle THE COURT: 3 doesn't tell me one way or the other where you're putting the transverse axis. I don't really care where the springs --4 5 MR. LYDEN: Well, the transverse axis is always going 6 to be perpendicular to the longitudinal, and it's always going 7 to intersect some part of the flexural axis, but it may not intersect the flexural axis dead center in the middle of the 8 9 It may be offset to the side. That's the only 10 difference in that patent versus the earlier one. 11 THE COURT: So can the transverse axis in the '797 patent intersect the longitudinal axis in '797 at a spot other 12 13 than where the flexural axis intersects the longitudinal axis? 14 MR. LYDEN: Yes. 15 THE COURT: And that would not be true of '878, 16 right? In '878, they all --MR. LYDEN: 17 No. 18 THE COURT: -- three come together at the same spot? 19 MR. LYDEN: Correct. In '878 they all come together 20 in one spot like a duplex in a scope, you know. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 22 You proposed a definition at one time of "said 23 transverse axis" that would sort of go along with this

colloquial idea of X marks the spot. Did you back away from

that because of evidence from the '797 patent, or is some of

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that evidence -- that is, evidence that's inconsistent with all three axes coming together in one spot associated with the '878 patent? MR. FERRARIO: I think, Your Honor, that in having looked at the '878 patent and trying to understand what teachings it had about the location of the --THE COURT: I'm going to stop you there. So --MR. FERRARIO: I was going to say both. THE COURT: All right. That's what I was hoping for. Let's start with an answer and then amplify so I know where your answer is going. So you do believe that you have evidence that -- from intrinsic evidence from the '878 patent that shows -- or that teaches that the transverse axis can be somewhere else on the longitudinal axis? MR. FERRARIO: What I think -- the way I would put it is that there isn't -- there's an absence of evidence on the '878 as to whether the transverse axis is limited to that one particular point. THE COURT: All right. Let's assume that in '878 that's true, that they all come together in one spot. And let's assume for a moment that that picture changes somehow the '797 patent. So the claim we're construing comes out of '878. What happens if we construe it only for purposes of '878 in a way that might not be true of '797? Where are we?

MR. FERRARIO: So we're -- so in that case you have a CIP, so you add new matter. And the question there would be what parts of the teachings of the CIP in the new matter, including form, what's interpretation of the claim terms of the '878 patent. And I would think that to the extent that the '878 patent had some terms that were less than fully described and defined, then those teachings would inform one or a part of the intrinsic record. They should be considered in the totality of the intrinsic record to understand the meaning of the term in the '878 patent.

THE COURT: Why is that the case instead of assuming that the inventor tried to claim something broader in the '878 patent -- or excuse me, in the '797 patent?

MR. FERRARIO: So I think there the question would be is it directed to a new embodiment, something that's broader. And I think, from my perspective, looking at these disclosures, it's because the inventor was using the exact same terms and was describing the embodiments in the exact same way. And so it wasn't distinguished as here is a new embodiment.

THE COURT: Well, if you were in '878 willing to -excuse me, if in '878 you were going to lock the transverse
axis on to a particular point along the longitudinal access,
and if in '797 you weren't going to lock it in, you were going
to allow it to occur in multiple places, and in both patents
you'd use the identical terms, right? You'd still be talking

about a flexural axis, a longitudinal axis, and a transverse axis. You just wouldn't be talking about them in terms of locking them in in the same spot. So I wouldn't be surprised that the same terms would occur. That wouldn't change, right?

MR. FERRARIO: I think that's a fair comment, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's take the third of the ones we're considering, and that's the anterior -- I'm going to take "anterior tangent point" next. And here the parties proposed definitions that are functionally and fundamentally pretty similar, but I don't mean "similar" in the sense of being almost identical to. So we can agree on that.

And for that reason I'm curious -- and I'll start with defendants -- really where is the difference between these two proposed definitions, yours and Mr. Lyden's?

MR. FERRARIO: Sure, Your Honor. Two differences.

One is the line in our proposal has to be a straight line. In our view, that's all that's ever shown in the '797 patent.

It's line 160 in, for example, figures 520 and 523, and it's expressly defined in the specification as previously defined here, with the inventor acting as his own lexicographer. So that's dispute number one.

Dispute number two comes down to essentially what does "tangent" mean. And tangent is not an intersection between two lines. It requires something more than that as a

1 And our proposed definition is intended to capture that, that there is some point between these two surfaces where 3 they were previously parallel and then no longer parallel, which would provide for an area, a point on that top surface 4 5 where something could be tangent to that top surface. Those are the two disputes between the parties. 6 7 THE COURT: So just so I'm clear on your demonstrative exhibit that I have in front of me here, the "not 8 9 this" posits that there's no parallel running of the red and green lines. The green line just comes off the red line. The 10 11 first you see, or whatever the green line represents is when it 12 breaks away from the red line? 13 MR. FERRARIO: That's right. 14 THE COURT: So I want to make sure you're not running 15 the two together underneath the word "not" there somehow. 16 MR. FERRARIO: No. 17 THE COURT: So what you mean is just on the left 18 where they are momentarily at least parallel? 19 MR. FERRARIO: That's right. 20 THE COURT: Thank you. 21 So your concern is that the language suggested by the 22 plaintiff would allow the "not this," and I'm not sure I'd know 23 how that language would, in fact, allow that. 24 MR. FERRARIO: Our reading -- yeah, I think -- Well, I can look at it again. Our reading of it is -- well, one is 25

1 it doesn't have this idea that it's a straight line of contact. 2 So the point where --3 THE COURT: I guess what you're -- I'm sorry to I quess what you're suggesting is that where it 4 discusses beginning to curve downward from the superior spring 5 element, that that doesn't -- certainly doesn't require 6 7 whatever happened before that to be parallel. MR. FERRARIO: I think it's just that. Yes, that's 8 9 correct. 10 THE COURT: And in your view it may not be required 11 that there be anything happening, parallel or otherwise, before 12 it starts to curve downward from the superior spring element, 13 right? 14 MR. FERRARIO: Yes, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. 16 Go ahead. 17 MR. LYDEN: Yes. On the subject of the anterior 18 tangent point, I feel that the defendants have kind of got it 19 mixed up with the idea that the inferior spring element is 20 supposed to be tangential in relationship to the superior 21 spring element. I show examples of that. That's very 22 possible. But I also show many examples where that is not the 23 case. What is true --24 25 Just so I'm clear, where what is not the THE COURT:

case?

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MR. LYDEN: Where the inferior spring element does not have a tangential relationship to the superior spring element, where it does not curve from a point of tangency.

What the anterior tangent point is all about is when you draw a curve, you know, you have a circle and the circle has a radius. A small circle gives you a very tight radius, a large circle gives you a longer radius and a more gentle curve. And what the anterior tangent point is is when you have an inferior spring element that is curved, it is a curved line that's going to have a radius of curvature. And when you do this in engineering drawings or even with a French curve with your hand, you have an origin point, you have the length of the radius, which defines how curved it is, sharp or gentle, and the point at which you start on that circle to generate the curve is what I call the anterior tangent point, because at that point you can draw a line tangent to the circle and you identify a spot on the circle where you're starting from. And you're also, by picking your starting point and then indicating what the radius is, you're defining the curvature, sharp or not.

So it really has to do with the point at which you generate the curve. It has nothing to do with whether the inferior spring element has to be tangential in its shape and curvature with respect to the superior spring element.

THE COURT: What's your dispute with the idea of a straight line of contact?

MR. LYDEN: Well, that's the other thing here. The anterior tension point is a point, it is not a line. Now, if you take a shoe like this (indicating), and you generate your curve and you create a single anterior tangent point to create the curve in one slice of space here, and then you move across it with multiple anterior tangent points, you then can connect those points and that will generate a line. And what that line is is where the two parts mate or lay up against one another. And that line is also consistent in my patent with not where the flexural axis is, because it's the joint between the two parts.

So the anterior tangent point is a point, it's not a line. You can connect anterior tangent points to create a line, but that's -- that's all it really is there.

Now, there was one spot in the specification where they noticed an error in connection with figure 617, where I had more line, you know, kind of stuck in there. And, frankly, it's an error, and that one glitch -- there's other figures like, I think, 523, the same things are shown. And they're looking at some -- what they see as lines on -- for example, I think it's 523. And if you actually look at the figure, there's a demarcation on the left where I'm incorporating off the part, saying here's the middle part of the part, here's the

1 tail end part of the part, here's the front. And those lines 2 are basically defining those segments of the part. And yes, 3 the lines can be generated by connecting a bunch of anterior tangent points and also the posterior tangent point, which 4 never lays up against anything, it's out there in free space, 5 but it's a tangent point because that's where that curve was 6 7 generated with the radius. So --Thank you. That's all I need to hear. 8 THE COURT: 9 MR. LYDEN: -- I hope that explains something there. 10 THE COURT: While we're talking about points, let's talk about "anteriormost side." And --11 12 MR. LYDEN: Would you like me to speak to that? 13 THE COURT: No, I'm going to start again with the 14 defense here. 15 Let me just ask you what your complaint is with 16 plaintiff's proposed construction of "anteriormost side." 17 MR. FERRARIO: Sure. I'll just pull this up so we 18 have it side by side. 19 THE COURT: Just so I can get it in my head a little 20 clearer, it seems that both of you agree that we're talking 21 about being closest to the footwear's anterior side. 22 what you mean when he says, "the front of the article of 23 footwear, "right? 24 MR. FERRARIO: Correct. 25 THE COURT: And so that you're in agreement on.

And so the main difference seems to be that you use the word "surface," and he uses the word "part" of the spring element.

What's the difference?

MR. FERRARIO: This dispute really came to a head when we looked at his infringement contentions. And what happens is, it's clear he's reading that side out of the claim term. So it doesn't even require a side. It can be in the same surface as the bottom surface. So the reason we proposed our construction was to make sure there has to be a separate side.

THE COURT: A separate side -- a separate side to the inferior spring element?

MR. FERRARIO: A separate side to the inferior spring element.

THE COURT: So that's saying it could be the same as the bottom? You mean it doesn't have to be a part of the inferior spring element, it could be a part of the superior spring element?

MR. FERRARIO: No, no, I'm sorry, Your Honor. It has to be part of the inferior spring element but it has to be a separate side, as opposed to the bottom. There has to be six separate sides to this construct, just as he describes and claims. He claims six sides in the claim element: an interior side, posterior side, a medial side, a lateral side, a top

surface, bottom surface. And when we go to look at the specification -- for example, figure 516 -- it shows these six sides very clearly: top, bottom, four sides of the rectangle. And this is in the disclosure of the '797 patent.

Now, the way he's interpreting it, using infringement contentions, is if you look at the shoe, he's taken what is the surface, and this is sort of an "S" shape at best (indicating), and he's saying, well, this is the anterior side and this is the bottom surface. And they're the same surface. So he's effectively read the anterior side or the anteriormost side out of the claim.

THE COURT: So your concern is that his claim construction would allow him to claim where there is a side connecting with the superior spring element, but also where it's not a side, it's -- either it's the bottom of the spring element or it's a point or something like that?

MR. FERRARIO: Yeah. Essentially --

THE COURT: I'm going to limit it to inferior spring elements that have an actual side that connect to a superior spring element.

MR. FERRARIO: Just as he shows in his patents, where there's a bottom surface and then there's a side that goes up, there needs to be that side.

THE COURT: And your principal authority for doing that is just that he has claimed sides?

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MR. FERRARIO: It is that he has used six different words, yes, as well as the disclosures in the specification which completely support and show the six distinct sides. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Lyden. MR. LYDEN: Yes, thank you. THE COURT: Just to tee it up a little more clearly in terms of what I'm concerned about --MR. LYDEN: Sure. THE COURT: -- the real concern really has nothing to do with the actual place where this all connects to the front of the article of footwear. It's what connects. MR. LYDEN: Right. THE COURT: And your opponents argue that the connection has to be made by an actual side to an inferior spring element. MR. LYDEN: Right. They wish to argue that kind of like a square house, you should be able to point to a square slash kind of side. Now, in my patent, that's not the way I use the word "side." For example --THE COURT: All right. So I'm going to stop you there. That's a perfectly acceptable argument to use the word "side" in other than its normal meaning. And that's what you're about to tell me, is because the normal meaning would

1 not include, you know, the two different locations on an S 2 curve or a point. But to do that, and as you're probably 3 aware, patent law allows an inventor to be his own lexicographer. 4 5 MR. LYDEN: Right. THE COURT: You have to point to me where in the 6 7 intrinsic evidence you've told someone that "side" doesn't mean what "side" normally means. 8 MR. LYDEN: Yeah, I was about to kind of get to that, 9 10 but thank you. 11 THE COURT: I only tee that up as much for your 12 benefit as mine, so you know where I'm concerned. 13 MR. LYDEN: I get it. 14 For example, I'll start with the shoe and then I'll 15 move to the inferior spring element. 16 I don't want you to start there. Where I THE COURT: want you to start is the actual language of the intrinsic 17 18 evidence that you point to that tells someone, this is what the 19 inventor meant by the word "side." 20 MR. LYDEN: Right. In my drawings and discussion, I point to this as 21 22 being the anterior side of the shoe, this is the posterior, 23 this is the medial and the lateral. Now, if you look at the shoe, I'm pointing at curves. These are curved surfaces. 24

They're not flat side curves, flat sides like a box.

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So when I use the word "side," you know, whether with a shoe or you could speak with your anatomy, I have a right side and a left side. I'm not square but I do have sides. And so we're speaking about an object that, to start with, you can hardly find a flat spot on the thing.

Now, when you start looking at the inferior spring element, there's embodiments where you have a removable inferior spring element, and it might have a front side that is very abrupt, very squarish, or it might have one that just tapers down to just a smooth point of contact. And it could still be removable. And I've assumed these kind of things in the patent.

The other embodiment that you got, which is more like this one, is you've got inferior spring elements that protrude from the superior spring element in a smooth curve. And in that case, when you look at it and say, well, where is the anterior side of the spring, well, it's going to be the closest part of the spring to the front of the shoe, the front side. And how do you find that? Well, with a drawing or if you've got a good eye, you can look at it and you find the -- what's called the -- some people call it an inflection point, some people call it the deflection point. It's a point at which that inferior spring element begins to protrude from the superior spring element, where it begins to emerge.

And the front side of that defines --

THE COURT: Would you stop for a minute. I'm tracking you. The only reason I'm interrupting you is not to be rude, but when I know where you're headed, with the limited time that I have, if I let you go on, then you'll waste time you need to spend on something else.

MR. LYDEN: Sorry.

THE COURT: So, again, I was looking for evidence of where one would look to get this special definition of "side," and I think you told me two places to look: one is that you use in the patent the term "side" to describe locations on the shoe itself, and your argument is that since one skilled in the art would know that those sides are not flat, you wouldn't go looking for flatness every time you used the word "side." Is that right?

MR. LYDEN: Correct.

THE COURT: And the second is that you have embodiments of the inferior spring element where it would be difficult to locate something classically thought of as a side because of their curvature; is that right?

MR. LYDEN: Correct, just as is the case with the adidas Springblade shoe.

THE COURT: Am I missing anything else that you want to point to where one would say, well, this is what he means by the word "side" in the intrinsic evidence? I'm asking you.

Those are two. Is there anything else?

MR. LYDEN: I'm sure the word is used throughout the file history many times. It's used in the patent many times. I do believe that there are some images that show this, and I believe they're in the materials that I've provided today. If you go through those, you can see that.

THE COURT: Thank you.

What's your response to the idea that those two points of evidence would teach someone that "side" has a particular meaning in this patent?

MR. FERRARIO: I would say with respect to the first point, I'm not entirely certain that the shoe is described as an anterior side and a posterior side. I'd want to go back and check, because I think there are anterior -- there's an anterior of the shoe and a posterior of the shoe. I'm not sure if it's side.

But even setting that aside, our construction doesn't require that these sides be flat, just separate and distinct from another side. So you would not say that the anterior part of the shoe is the same as the medial or lateral part of the shoe. You could not confuse those two. They would have separate and distinct sides to them. And that is what our construction counsels. So that would be my response to the first point.

With respect to the second --

THE COURT: I'm just trying to visualize your

argument. So does this come up with embodiments that come to a point? Is that an issue?

MR. FERRARIO: With embodiments that come to a point?

THE COURT: What I'm curious about is his definition that he's proposed, I guess your concern is that it could somehow end up describing the same thing as the bottom side of the spring element.

MR. FERRARIO: I think that his proposed definition would allow him to do just what he tried to do in his original contention, which is to say this surface is the both the bottom and the anterior side. And we think that's incorrect.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FERRARIO: If Your Honor may indulge, there is, we think, a very clear picture that we have in our brief of the embodiment where there's no identification of a side, there's nothing here that says, hey, this is the side. That's one embodiment. And then he has another picture in the patent which shows very clearly that there is a side. And that's where he labels it -- Do you know what figure that is?

So 541 -- I'm sorry, 451 very clearly identifies -- and this is in the brief -- an inferior spring element that has this wall that -- it doesn't have to be flat, it just has a separate and distinct side, whereas he has other embodiments that don't have that side. When that is there, that's disclosed as the anteriormost side.

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spring is, and --

THE COURT: Are you able to show me an embodiment that does not have that separate side? MR. FERRARIO: I think that the embodiment that was discussed in the briefing is this one here that is described as not having a distinct separate anteriormost side. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And that is figure 451 in the patent? MR. FERRARIO: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Yes, sir? MR. LYDEN: I quess the only thing I might add is that when you're looking for this side, when you're dealing with an embodiment that has a smooth curve and you don't have, you know, a flat-sided edge to it, it's going to be close to where this anterior tangent point is and where this line that can be generated by joining that, because that's where the two parts mate on the front side of the inferior spring. And it's going to be very close to where the flexural axis is, where the two come together and where they bend from. So both of those

THE COURT: The real question is did you actually claim or did you actually submit embodiments that don't have an anteriormost side?

things put you pretty close to where that front side of that

MR. LYDEN: I'm sure, I think --

THE COURT: Or at least not one that's separate and distinct from other sides of the inferior spring element?

MR. LYDEN: You know, I think I have just about every wording in there, where you've got something that's attachable, very flat side, some that are somewhat abrupt, some that are perfectly smooth -- smooth curve, but they're all going to have that deflection point, they're all going to have that point which they break from the superior spring element, and that marks where the inferior spring element begins and where the superior spring element ends, and that then establishes where the front side of the thing is.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Let me turn with that point back to adidas for just a moment. So I suppose I was going to say speaking metaphysically, but it's actually probably physically, that in any way in which the inferior spring element is connecting to the superior spring element, we might call it as small as a point and not a distinct side, meaning a separate surface, but even a line of points, wherever that is in the physical world, represents something other than an imaginary point -- in other words, a side of some kind, doesn't it? I didn't phrase that very well, I quess, but --

MR. FERRARIO: I think I understand.

THE COURT: But the entire point of contact here, mechanically speaking, has to represent at least at some

microscopic level a distinct surface from anything else, right?

MR. FERRARIO: Certainly I think at any point where there's something that's coming off something else in a curve, I would agree at some point there is material there which is some form of a side. I don't know -- at least at the microscopic level. But I think when you put it in the context here of what's disclosed and what's described, I think I heard Mr. Lyden say there's all these different variations, and some of which have a separate and distinct side and some of which don't. And I think, from my perspective, when I read the claims, there are some claims that don't require anteriormost side. But if you're going to claim it, you have to look to see what's in the specification, and it has to be a separate and distinct side.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

I think the last term in play is the word "affixed."

And so adidas has suggested that it must be affixed using some sort of adhesive or mechanically mating parts.

Where would you get that from the patent itself?

MR. FERRARIO: Yes, Your Honor. So that is in column

8, lines 15 to 20. And that disclosure discloses adhesives,

fasteners, or other mechanically made parts and the like. And
that's expressly found in the specification.

THE COURT: Why -- so you believe that then covers all possible uses of the meanings of the word "affixed" in the

1 patent, or is it just one of several possible meanings? MR. FERRARIO: What I think is that in the context of 2 3 the specification, the way it's also used in another section means that "affixed" is where you take two separate things and 4 put them together. And how you put them together means 5 fastener or adhesive or chemical or the like, as opposed to or 6 7 alternatively and distinguished from integrally formed pieces. THE COURT: So isn't that the real distinction you're 8 trying to draw, not how they're attached together, but just 9 that they must be somehow functionally attached together, once 10 11 having been two parts, now rendered functionally one? 12 MR. FERRARIO: Yes, and not integrally formed. 13 THE COURT: Meaning what? 14 MR. FERRARIO: Meaning molded together. Form is 15 what --16 THE COURT: If in the manufacturing process you made the inferior and the superior spring elements all at once as a, 17 18 quote, spring element, in your view that wouldn't work, 19 wouldn't meet these claims? They have to be two separate 20 parts? I'm not sure you care whether they're glued together or somehow some other way put together, just as long as they're 21 22 put together; is that right? 23 MR. FERRARIO: That's right. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 24 25 Your response?

Well, first let me ask you -- Let me be more precise. Are you claiming that this language would cover a spring element made all at once; that is, as he put it, integrated, where what you call a superior spring element and an inferior spring element are made as one single piece, let's say, in the manufacturing stage. Would that meet this claim?

MR. LYDEN: Yes. That was my intention in using the word "affixed." I went through a --

THE COURT: Well, if they were never separate, then how do they become affixed?

MR. LYDEN: Well, you know, if we look at the words: "affixed" and "attached," they can be used both ways, and you can find that in patents and in common usage, like my arm is attached to my body, but then we have attachments to emails that are separate things. And so the words can go both ways.

And because in my patent I have versions where the inferior spring element is removably attached or removably secured, I thought the word "attachment" smacked a little bit too much of being removable and being separate, and I thought the word "affixed" was more neutral. And that's why I chose it over "fixed," which is what they use in their patent. Similar patent, similar structures, they used the word "fixed," I used the word "affixed." Neither one of us used "attached," I quess.

So there was some thought about why to choose that

1 word and specifically had that word cover both embodiments 2 because both of them were present and being taught in my 3 So why don't I stop there. patent. 4 THE COURT: Thank you. 5 I'm going to a break -- unless you have something else you want to add, I'm going to take a break and think about 6 7 this and come back with my ruling shortly. MR. FERRARIO: Your Honor, just one correction. 8 9 think when we were talking about anteriormost side earlier, I 10 just want to note that the figure in our brief is actually figure 456, and it's the same -- it's essentially the same 11 figure as 451, which I identified during oral argument. I just 12 13 wanted to make that record clear. 14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 15 MR. LYDEN: Can I make a last point on the affixed 16 part? It's a little bit --THE COURT: What are we talking about? 17 18 MR. LYDEN: The affixed business here. 19 THE COURT: All right. 20 MR. LYDEN: With regard to "affixed," and whether 21 they were ever separate and whether or not -- you know, when 22 you make a spring element out of carbon fiber, and if you want 23 to make it an integral part, it's made by laminating 25 to 35 24 pieces of carbon fiber upon one another, and then you vacuum 25 bag it, you cook it in an oven and bake it, basically, and then

you get the unitary piece out of it. But it was never like one thing to begin with.

The same thing is true even when you injection mold. It starts out as beads of plastic of different formula being mixed, put in a screwdriver, melted, blended, and then injected. So it's not like this unitary piece comes out of nowhere of the ether. In neither case were they ever one thing in the beginning. You're always putting something together, whether you put it by fusing it mechanically, bonding it, adhesive or whatever. And that's the case.

THE COURT: I understand what you're saying. Even adidas can't make a shoe ex nihilo. So there you go.

THE CLERK: This court is in recess.

(A recess is then taken.)

THE COURT: All right. We got five terms to be -- or phrases to be defined today. The first one is "similar to."

And I have one ruling and one tentative thought on that.

The first is that it does not require nor is it really susceptible of further definition. So, in that sense, it has a plain and ordinary meaning, and I'm not going to define it any further. That's the *Markman* ruling: no further definition.

Adidas also makes the argument -- has made the argument both now and in its briefing that this term is indefinite. And although it's, I think, appropriate to bring

it up now, it's not a classic *Markman* ruling in the sense of defining the term; rather, it's something a little broader than that in saying that the term is flawed in this way.

And I'm going to think about that. I think that's correct. I think it's indefinite because one can't know from a wide variety of possibilities which one is being claimed here. But I'm going to take that portion of this under advisement.

So certainly I'll not define it any further. I may rule that it's indefinite or I may require it, as a different sort of argument, be brought up in summary judgment. One of those latter two is in the future. I'll let you know.

The second phrase that was said by adidas to be indefinite I don't find to be indefinite. And that's the phrase "said transverse axis." And so this phrase, particularly inclusive of the word "said," is being defined right now for our purposes only for the '878 patent. And I adopt plaintiff's proposed definition of "said transverse axis."

Then just to read it into the record so that you're clear on it, that would be, "transverse axis corresponds to a straight line drawn perpendicular to the longitudinal axis which also intersects the flexural axis of the inferior spring element at the same point."

The only change I'll make to that definition, given what I've said about it being limited to the phrase found in

'878, is that just before the first word I read, "transverse,"
I'm going to put the word "said" so that we're clear that what
I'm defining is "said transverse axis."

Now, "transverse axis" isn't really something the parties dispute the meaning of, and it will mean what it means in '878 and '797. But the particular phrase "said transverse axis" I give the meaning I just described only in '878. What that might mean down the road for '797, I'm not sure, but that's the limit of my ruling.

The next word to be defined is "affixed." And the parties have proposed relatively similar thoughts about what it means. I think I understand the basic dispute.

Here is the definition I'm giving it.

"Fixed: Two separate components that are attached to and have some functional relationship with each other."

And I'll give you this in writing later. "Two separate components that are attached to and have some functional relationship with each other."

The next phrase I'll define is "anteriormost side."

And I've heard the dispute there. I accept defendants'

proposed definition, "The surface distinct from any other side or surface that is closest to the footwear's anterior side."

And what I think that does is simply require that of the six sides of the spring element, the inferior spring element, no side can play two roles. It can't be, you know,

1 the inferior side and the anterior side all at once. 2 I'm not by this definition requiring that the side be 3 somehow some sort of rectangular or squared-up surface like the side of a house at all, just that it be distinct from, let's 4 5 say, the inferior side. All right. Then I think that leaves us with 6 7 "anterior tangent point." Mr. Lyden, do you have your proposed definition in 8 front of you there? 9 10 MR. LYDEN: Not immediately, but I believe it was in 11 my responsive brief. 12 THE COURT: Let me just give the ruling. I'll ask 13 you a question about it after I read it out loud in just a 14 moment. 15 MR. LYDEN: Sure. 16 THE COURT: I don't believe that a straight line of contact is necessary as part of a definition of "anterior 17 18 tangent point." 19 Mr. Lyden has proposed the following definition: "where on the top side of an inferior spring element portion it 20 21 begins to curve downward from the superior spring element 22 portion of a larger spring element.

My only question is this. You suggest that it

probably expresses best what "anterior tangent point" means.

And although certainly not poetic, I think that

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     happens when the top side of the inferior spring element begins
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     to curve downward, and I don't know whether you mean curve
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     literally or just slope downward. What is it you're saying
     there?
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                          I use the word "curve" here, and --
               MR. LYDEN:
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               THE COURT: And that's because all of your inferior
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     spring elements are curves?
                                Some of them -- there are some in
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               MR. LYDEN:
                           No.
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     the patent that are actually straight.
                           In which case it would just slope
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               THE COURT:
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     downward not curve?
               MR. LYDEN: It would slope not curve. But I think --
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               THE COURT: Let me ask you this, then. Do you
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     have -- is there a reason that you would object to me changing
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     the word "curve" to "slope"?
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               MR. LYDEN: Do you believe that "slope" includes
     sloping curve? I'm all right with "curve."
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               THE COURT: All right. Then we'll leave it at
     "curve."
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               So I'll give it again. You'll get this in writing.
21
     "Where on the top side of an inferior spring element portion it
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     begins to curve downward from the superior spring element
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     portion of a larger spring element."
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               I'll give you a minute order with these definitions
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     in it.
             That concludes the Markman portion of this hearing.
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I don't want to keep you too long, but while you're here, let's just check in on the progress of the case. Where are we, for example, with relation to discovery? I'll start with adidas.

MR. FERRARIO: Your Honor, we have not -- we've done all of the document production and discovery in the case.

We've not yet done deposition or fact discovery. I understand the discovery schedule closes at the end of January.

THE COURT: How do you feel about that?

MR. FERRARIO: I think it should be okay. I have a little concern about some of the scope of some of the requests that have come from Mr. Lyden, and I think that we are looking at those, and we'll perhaps meet and confer with Mr. Lyden over the next week or so to try to see if we can corral some of the discovery requests a bit.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FERRARIO: I'm happy to go into more detail if you'd like, or --

THE COURT: No. I just want to say to both of you -to you, Mr. Lyden, in particular. You wouldn't necessarily be
aware of this. So on December 1, amendments to the discovery
rule come into play, and they require judges to incorporate
even more vigorously than in the past a concept of
proportionality, where the expense of discovery shouldn't cost
more than what the discovery ends up being worth. So that's

something I'm going to look at carefully. Just make sure you hone in on what you really need and aren't claiming more.

MR. LYDEN: Yes, Your Honor. If you can recall -- and you get so many cases in, I know. We had an oral hearing, a Rule 16 conference that related to discovery back in June, I think it was.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LYDEN: One of my concerns there was that there was reluctance or hesitation on the part of adidas to produce discovery.

Now, back in June, early July, I gave to adidas over 48,000 pages of discovery that they got from me, and it was well organized. And one of my concerns -- and they were made aware of this -- I'm at a point where I feel I have to file a motion to compel because I've only received less than 6,000 pages of documents, and most of it has been their prior art search relating to patents. I would say of the 50-something requests that I have, I think they had close to 100, 90 percent of it has not been yet produced. And we've had discussions about it. They've pushed back and basically indicated that they don't want to give me these things. And I've tried to explain this is why I want this, this is reasonable. I don't believe I have any unreasonable requests. And so --

THE COURT: Let me just say this about that. It's not unusual that the bulk of discovery occurs after a Markman

1 hearing so that the parties can have some idea of what's really 2 in play versus not. 3 MR. LYDEN: Sure. THE COURT: But we're on a tight timetable, so I want 4 you to work hard at making this happen. So now I do expect the 5 6 bulk of discovery to go about quickly. 7 MR. FERRARIO: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: And then that closes the end of January, 8 and there's a briefing schedule that has us with an established 9 10 summary judgment hearing date. You'll have to remind me if 11 that's true or not. 12 MR. FERRARIO: There is a deadline for summary judgment briefing, Your Honor, but as I read it, it doesn't 13 14 preclude moving earlier in -- as I read the order. 15 THE COURT: I offered to set deadlines for briefing 16 but not a hearing date. What did we do in this case? In this case we do have a hearing date 17 MR. FELDMAN: on the calendar, which I believe is August 12th of 2016. 18 19 THE COURT: You could build the Empire State Building faster than that. 20 21 MR. FELDMAN: And I think that that was based off the 22 deadline for the summary judgment motions, which was in early 23 June. 24 THE COURT: All right. Well, as you say, there's 25 nothing that prevents us from moving more quickly if you're

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ready with your briefing, and we can move it up if necessary.
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     Otherwise, we'll move towards that date, and that gives
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     everybody more than enough time.
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               Anything else we need to bring up while you're here
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     for the record?
               MR. FERRARIO: Not for defendants, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: For you, Mr. Lyden?
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               MR. LYDEN: I don't think so, Your Honor.
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                           Thank you all for being here today.
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               THE COURT:
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     We're adjourned.
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               THE CLERK:
                           This court is now adjourned.
               (Proceedings concluded.)
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--000--I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature or conformed signature is not certified. /s/Bonita J. Shumway 11/19/2015 BONITA J. SHUMWAY, CSR, RMR, CRR DATE Official Court Reporter